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Abstract
The political factors, which shape IMF lending to LDCs, have attracted much at-
t e n t i o n .T h es a m eg o e sf o rt h er o l ea n di n ﬂuence of the US. However, formal modelling
is scant. In this paper, we assume that the US is principal within the IMF and seeks
t om a x i m i z ei t si m p a c to nt h ep o l i c ys t a n c eo fd e b t o rc o u n t r i e s .W ed e r i v et h eo p t i m a l
loan allocation mechanism, and test the hypothesis that the probability of an IMF
loan is increasing in the amount of political concessions countries make. A political
concession is deﬁned as the distance between a country’s bliss point and its actual
policy stance measured relative to the US. We propose a bliss-point proxy and test our
hypothesis in a sample of 68 countries during the period 1986-94. There is support for
our hypothesis in the data. Finally, we show that omitting bliss points may lead to
endogeneity bias in empirical work.
JEL classiﬁcation: F33; F34; O1; Keywords: IMF lending; Political factors
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Countries in need of an arrangement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund)
typically approach the Fund once alternative ways of ﬁnancing balance-of-payments deﬁcits
are no longer available. The need of borrower countries for Fund arrangements is therefore
likely to respond to a variety of economic factors (Knight and Santaella, 1997; Goldstein and
Montiel, 1986; Bird, 1995 & 1996). On the other hand, the granting of IMF loans depends
on Fund willingness to approve an arrangement on the basis of the economic stabilization
program put forward. Hence, IMF lending is, as demonstrated by Knight and Santaella
(1997), a joint outcome of economic demand and supply factors.
Moving beyond the economic determinants of IMF lending, claims have over the years
been made based on anecdotal evidence that political factors play a critical role in determin-
ing whether countries are successful in obtaining IMF loans or not. Moreover, the particular
role and inﬂuence of the US on IMF behavior has attracted much attention. Calomiris (2000)
provides two interesting recent examples:1
“Ecuador has been suﬀering a deepening ﬁscal crisis for several years caused
by the combination of an unresolved internal policy struggle, adverse economic
shocks to its terms of trade, and a poorly regulated banking system [...]. As yet,
there is no consensus for reform in Ecuador, and there is no reason to believe
that reforms will be produced by a few hundreds of millions of IMF dollars. Why
in the world is the IMF sending money to Ecuador? Some observes claim that
IMF aid to Ecuador is best understood as a means of sending political payola to
the Ecuadorian government at a time when the United States wishes to ensure
continuing use of its military bases there monitoring drug traﬃc.” (p. 88).
1See Killick (1995) for earlier case-study based evidence.
2“A knowledgeable insider informs me that the U.S. government has told Pak-
istan that its access to IMF subsidized lending depends on its willingness to sign a
nuclear nonproliferation treaty. According to this person, unless Pakistan agrees,
the U.S. will block its IMF program.” (p. 99).
In fact, in a study sponsored by the US Congress, the Meltzer Commission (2000) implic-
itly accepts the view that G7 governments, particularly the US, use the IMF as a vehicle to
achieve own political ends (see also Bird and Rowlands, 2001). This is feasible since voting
power in the IMF Executive Board is based on the size of the quotas of member countries.
The US holds around 17% of the votes, and this in eﬀect gives the US veto power over all
decisions requiring so-called special voting majority (85%). In addition, the US Executive
Director is appointed by the American Government and is obliged by law to clear his or her
decisions with the US Secretary of the Treasury (Oatley and Yackee, 2000).
Econometric studies of the role of political factors in the decision making of the IMF
have also started to emerge. Examples include Thacker (1999), Bird and Rowlands (2001)
and Barro and Lee (2002). The common characteristic of these papers is that they specify
empirical models based on a long list of potential explanatory variables, and they all con-
clude that political and institutional factors, including US inﬂuence, matter and add to our
understanding of Fund lending. However, none of the papers provide any formal theoretical
model of the rationale governing the allocation of IMF loans.
Consider the interesting and widely quoted paper by Thacker (1999). He hypothesizes
that IMF lending is inﬂuenced by political “proximity” between the potential borrower and
the US, as well as by political “movement” towards the US policy position.2 Proximity is
found to be statistically signiﬁcant, but only at the 10% level, a ﬁnding echoed by Barro and
Lee. In contrast, movement is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Thacker concludes that potential
2Political proximity is captured by a variable constructed from data on voting in the United Nations
General Assembly, and movement is calculated as the change in this variable.
3borrower countries are rewarded if they move closer to the US political position regardless
of absolute alignment. Yet, the lack of a formal theoretical underpinning makes Thacker’s
results diﬃcult to interpret: Why should the US reward a country taking a position close to
t h eU Ss t a n c ei ft h a tp a r t i c u l a rc o u n t r yw o u l dh a v ed o n es or e g a r d l e s so fa n yr e w a r d ?
In the stylized model put forward in this paper, the empirical implications of the US
maximizing its overall inﬂuence on the policy stance of IMF member countries are derived.3
The IMF loan allocation problem is posed as a mechanism design problem.4 We solve for
an optimal mechanism in which the US allocates IMF loans through an all-pay auction-
type mechanism, where loan allocation probabilities are increasing in the size of political
concessions. Political concessions are deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a country’s actual
policy position and its true political preferences, both measured relative to the US position.5
True political preferences are identiﬁed as bliss points in a policy space ranging from no to
complete alignment with the US. Actual positions are measured in the same policy space.
Our theoretical framework suggests that neglecting bliss points can lead to endogeneity
bias. This is potentially important since all existing studies to our knowledge neglect bliss
points, relying on proximity, not the diﬀerence between proximity and bliss points. Since,
theoretically, these two variables are correlated, any ap r i o r yconsistent empirical test must
either construct a proxy variable for the bliss points or rely on a ﬁxed eﬀects approach
to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity. Opting for the former approach, we propose an
empirical proxy for the bliss points and test our model using both Thacker’s dataset and his
basic empirical speciﬁcation. It emerges that our political concession variable is statistically
preferred to Thacker’s political movement variable.
In sum, both our theoretical model and the empirical results indicate that bliss points
3Some argue that the interests of private ﬁnancial institutions (especially US ﬁnancial institutions) also
inﬂuence the decisions of the IMF (see Gould, 2003 and Oatley and Yackee, 2000). While concurring with
the main trust of this argument, we do not pursue this type of inﬂuence here.
4An introduction to the literature on mechanism design is Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
5True political preferences are taken as a primitive datum.
4should be taken into account. True political preferences of IMF member countries need to be
considered in the analysis, and when they are accounted for neither movement nor proximity
seem to matter. Moreover, by demonstrating that the data are consistent with maximizing
behavior, our paper strengthens the thesis that political factors play a decisisve role in IMF
lending decisions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the model and solves for
the optimal mechanism. In Section 3, we derive empirical implications and test the model.
Conclusions are oﬀered in Section 4.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 The set-up
Suppose that N countries from the set N = {1,..,N} are competing for the allocation of
an IMF loan, and assume that the US plays the role of principal within the IMF.6 Further,
assume that the US designs a loan allocation mechanism, which maximizes the degree of
alignment with its position on key foreign policy issues. Let bi ∈ [0,1] be the true preferences
of country i relative to the US (country i’s bliss point), with the US bliss point equal to 1.
Also, let the bi’s be publicly observable. A given country can take a position pi ∈ [0,1],
where pi =1indicates complete alignment with the US. Let ti = pi − bi be the political
concession (henceforth political payment) country i can oﬀer in exchange for a loan allocation
probability. The total amount of political payments achieved by the US therefore equals
PN
i=1 ti.
Fig. 1 illustrates the setup. The maximum political payment country i can oﬀer is given
by wi =1− bi. Countries therefore face a constraint on their political payments. The closer
6At ﬁrst glance, the assumption of just one loan seems restrictive since in reality the IMF allocates several
loans. One way to think of this is as if all but one loan are allocated according to economic criteria and then
the last loan is allocated by US discretion.
5country i’s true preferences are to the US position, the less there is to oﬀer and pay in terms
of political payments.
US i b i p
ii i tp b =-
1 ii w b = -
Fig. 1. The policy space
T u r n i n gt ot h es p e c i ﬁcation of country utility, assume that all countries are risk neutral
with expected utility given by
ui = θixi − ti (i ∈ N),
where xi ∈ [0,1] is the probability that country i receives the loan to be allocated, θi
is country i’s valuation of the loan, and ti ∈ [0,1] is the expected political payment.7 For
simplicity we take the US valuation of the IMF loan to be zero, and this is common knowledge




≡ Θ ⊆ [0,1] is private information. We take the
θi’s to be identically and independently distributed according to the distribution function
F(·), which is assumed to be continuously diﬀerentiable with density f(·) and bounded below
by a strictly positive number. Finally, the problem is assumed to be regular.8
It follows that in order to maximize its overall political inﬂuence, the US has to design
7We restrict attention to ti ∈ [0,1] since in equilibrium political payments are always nonnegative. Al-
ternatively, we could have used ti ∈ [−1,1] and ui = θixi − |ti|.
8The problem is regular if the virtual valuation ψ(θ)=θ − (1 − F(θ))/f(θ) is increasing in θ (Krishna,
2002).
6a loan allocation mechanism that maximizes
PN
i=1 ti, taking into account the constraints on
the size of political payments that individual countries face.9
2.2 The optimal Bayesian mechanism
In deriving the optimal mechanism, two simplifying steps are useful. First, we invoke the
revelation principle (Myerson, 1981), and secondly, we show that the constraints on political
payments imply that attention can be restricted to all-pay mechanisms. The revelation
principle gives that the US can restrict attention to feasible direct revelation mechanisms,
where feasibility refers to constraints on individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and
resources (i.e. constraints on the xi’s).










i (θi,θ −i) is the political payment by country i if it gets the loan and tL
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9Our framework could of course be further developed by taking into account the fact that countries, which
are close to the US in terms of bliss points, could be at risk of moving further away from the US position if an
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∀i ∈ N,∀θ ∈ Θ
N¢
, (5)
where (2) are the incentive compatibility constraints; (3) the individual rationality con-
straints; (4) the resource constraints; and (5) the constraints on political payments.
Turning now to the second simplifying step, lemma 1 below states that in the presence
of observable constraints on political payments, wi =1− bi (equivalently, observable bliss
points bi), attention can always without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.) be restricted to all-pay
mechanisms where countries submit non-refundable political payments.10
Lemma 1 When countries face publicly observed bliss points, bi, attention can always w.l.o.g.
be restricted to all-pay mechanisms in which tW
i (θi,θ −i)=tL
i (θi,θ −i)=ti(θi) for i ∈ N. In
fact, all-pay mechanisms weakly revenue dominate any other mechanism.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
10Laﬀont and Roberts (1996) also rely on this second step in their paper. They do not, however, provide
a formal proof. The proof of lemma 1 partly relies on arguments in Maskin (2000).
8Using lemma 1, the problem of the US, (1) to (5), can be simpliﬁed. To see this, note
that by lemma 1, country i’s political payment function is independent of whether country
i receives the loan or not, and independent of the other country types, but dependent upon
country i’s own type. That is, a country makes a non-refundable political payment, which
















Eθ−i [xi (θi,θ −i)]θi − ti (θi) ≥ 0 (∀i ∈ N and ∀θi ∈ Θ), (8)









ti (θi) ≤ wi, (∀i ∈ N,∀θi ∈ Θ). (10)
Krishna (2002) deﬁnes a standard auction as a mechanism which allocates the object to
the bidder making the highest oﬀer. The next two propositions provide restrictions on the
parameter space, b1×··×bN ×Θ, which ensures that the solution to the problem (6) to (10)
is a standard auction.
Proposition 2 When all N countries have bliss points suﬃciently far away from the US
bliss point, i.e. when maxbi ≤ 1 − θ, the optimal mechanism is a standard all-pay auction
in which the loan is allocated to the country making the highest political payment.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
9When maxbi > 1 − θ (or equivalently, minwi < θ), the problem is more complicated.
However, Laﬀont and Robert (1996) have solved (6)-(10) analytically in the symmetric case
(bi = bj = b).
Proposition 3 When all N countries have identical bliss points, i.e. when bi = bj = b
for all i,j ∈ N, the optimal mechanism is a standard all-pay auction in which the loan is
allocated to the country making the highest political payment.
Proof. Follows from Laﬀont and Robert (1996).
Consequently, when maxbi ≤ 1 − θ and/or bi = bj = b, the optimal way for the US to
allocate IMF loans is through a standard all-pay auction. Countries submit non-refundabe
political payments and the country with the highest payment receives the loan.
Turning to the asymmetric case in the unrestricted parameter space, no analytical solu-
tion is available.11 We therefore proceed to solve numerically the asymmetric problem in the
simple two-country case where types are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution.
2.2.1 A numerical solution
Let Pr(θi = θ)=ν and Pr(θi = θ)=1−ν, where 0 <θ< θ. The problem (6)-(10) can now














Before proceeding to the solution, we make the following deﬁnition: A mechanism is
an auction-type mechanism if the country making the highest political payment stands the
highest probability of receiving the loan. That is,
11When bi = bj = b, the analysis is complicated, but manageable (Laﬀont and Robert, 1996), since
symmetry of the strategies can be imposed. Clearly, this is not possible when bi 6= bj. Without symmetry
we face a highly complex control problem.
10Deﬁnition 4 The mechanism hxi (θ1,θ 2),t i (θi)ii∈{1,2} is an auction-type mechanism if
(ti(θi) − tj(θj)) · (xi (θ1,θ2) − xj (θ1,θ2)) ≥ 0
for all i,j ∈ {1,2} and for all (θ1,θ 2) ∈ Θ2.
Clearly, a standard auction (including the standard all-pay auction), in which the bidder
making the highest bid wins, satisﬁes deﬁnition 4.
Fig. 2 illustrates an optimal all-pay auction-type mechanism. First, it follows immedi-
ately from eyeballing the ﬁgure that deﬁnition 4 is satisﬁed. Second, the constraint on polit-
ical payments, w1 =0 .3, is always binding for a high-type country 1 when υ ∈ (0.438,0.570).
Country 2 on the other hand does not face a de facto constraint on political payments, since
country 2 will never pay more than θ = w2. However, a high-type country 2 does pay w2
when υ ∈ (0.438,0.570). Finally, the optimal mechanism does not allocate the loan to a
low-type country 2 and a low-type country 1 when v ≥ 0.429 and υ ≥ 0.572, respectively.
11In these cases, political payments from low types are zero.
Fig. 2. The optimal mechanism with θ =0 .7,θ=0 .3,w 1 =0 .3,w 2 =0 .7
2.3 A testable hypothesis
Appendix A.3 reports results from optimizations on 28,000 parameter combinations. We
ﬁnd that in over 97% of the cases, an all-pay auction-type mechanism is optimal. Moreover,
when the conditions in proposition 2 and 3 are met, a standard all-pay auction is always
optimal. In all these cases, it is optimal for the US to allocate IMF loans through an all-pay
auction-type mechanism. The country that makes the highest political payment stands the
highest probability of receiving the IMF loan. This is an intuitive result: if the US wants
to maximize its overall political inﬂuence on IMF member countries, it will reward large
12political concessions with IMF loans more frequently. This is our testable hypothesis.12
It should be noted that our hypothesis is diﬀerent from the political proximity hypothesis
found in the studies by Barro and Lee (2002) and Thacker (1999). In our model, proximity
with the US foreign policy stand is not necessarily positively correlated with the probability
of getting an IMF loan. The following example provides an illustration hereof.
Example 5 C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r eθ =0 .3, θ =0 .7,w 1 =0 .3, w2 =0 .7. This is the
scenario in Fig. 2 above. Let ν =0 .8 and let both countries be high types. Inspection of

















Using ti = pi − bi and bi =1− wi, we obtain p1 =0 .973 >p 2 =0 .867. Hence, country 1 is
voting more in accordance with the US than country 2, but the former stands a lower chance
of receiving the loan.
If, however, bliss points (i.e. true political preferences) are taken into account, we should
expect a positive correlation between political concessions (i.e. political payments) and the
probability of getting an IMF loan.
Related, Example 5 draws attention to the key point that countries with higher bliss
points will, ceteris paribus, take positions closer to the US. This has implications for the
empirical analysis in that it introduces an endogeneity problem if we fail to account for bliss
points; a point to which we will return in Section 3.2 below.
In sum, framing the issues addressed in this paper in a simple theoretical model leads to
new insights with important implications for the way in which empirical testing should be
conducted.
12On a practical level, the hypothesis that loans are allocated through an (implicit) all-pay auction-type
mechanism is appealing, because it is a simple implementable mechanism. In contrast, a mechanism which
is not of the auction type would be diﬃcult to implement and thus violate Wilson’s simplicity doctrine (see
Krishna, 2002).
133 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Testing the model
We rely on both the dataset and the empirical baseline model used in Thacker (1999) in
our empirical analysis.13 According to Bird and Rowlands (2001, p. 252), Thacker’s paper
provides “the best example to date of integrating political and economic variables into the
analysis of Fund lending”.
The dataset consists of annual observations from 83 developing countries during the
period 1985 to 1994. The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the value of
1 for a country year if the country received an IMF Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) or an
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) loan during a given calendar year.14 Explanatory variables
include standard macroeconomic factors, which are expected to aﬀect both the demand for
and the supply of IMF loans.
Thacker introduces in addition two political variables in order to capture US inﬂuence on
IMF lending. The ﬁrst, kvotei,t−2, is a proxy for the political proximity between the sample
country and the US (corresponding to pi in our theoretical model).15 More speciﬁcally,
kvotei,t−2 is measured by the degree of coincidence between the votes of the sample country
and the US in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on issues, which the US
Department of State deﬁnes as key votes. These votes are listed in the annual US Department
of State publication "Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations". The
report from 1985 notes that:
“[the] only votes that can legitimately be read as a measure of support for
the United States are those which we identiﬁed as important to us, and on which
13Thacker’s original dataset is made accessible, in a very user-friendly way, at
http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/data.html.
14While the IMF uses a variety of instruments in supporting member countries, the SBA and EFF are the
main IMF arrangements when it comes to short term balance of payments support.
15Subscript i refers to country and subscript t to year.
14we lobbied other nations” (quoted in Thacker, 1999 p. 53).
Moreover, the report from 2000 states that:
“[...] a country’s behavior at the United Nations is always relevant to its
bilateral relationship with the United States, a point the Secretary of State reg-
ularly makes in letters of instruction to new U.S. ambassadors. [...] The Security
Council and the General Assembly are arguably the most important international
bodies in the world, dealing as they do with such vital issues as threats to peace
and security, disarmament, development, humanitarian relief, human rights, the
environment and narcotics - all of which can and do directly aﬀect major U.S.
interest.” (US State Department, 2000 p. 8).
The proxy kvotei,t−2 is calculated as a decimal between 0 and 1, where ascending values
indicate higher degrees of alignment with the US.16
Thacker’s second political variable, mkvotei,t−1, captures political movement. It is deﬁned
as mkvotei,t−1 = kvotei,t−1 − kvotei,t−2 and it measures the change in sample country i’s
political proximity with the US from year t − 2 to year t − 1. The variable belongs to the
interval [−1,1], where a positive value reﬂects that the sample country has moved towards
the US position.
3.2 Proxy-variable approach
According to our theoretical model, omitting bliss points could result in a misspeciﬁcation,
which may have serious consequences for stastistical inference. To see this, recall that politi-
cal concessions, ti,a r ed e ﬁned as ti = pi−bi. Including only pi in an empirical model will lead
16Thacker assigned a value of 1 to votes in agreement with the US, whereas votes in disagreement with
t h eU Sw e r eg i v e n0 value. Abstentions and absences by the sample country were included as 0.5. The
justiﬁcation for assigning 0.5 to nonvotes is that they can be interpreted as neutral votes. We note that an
abstention or an absence does not mean that a sample country was not eligible to vote. This is an issue to
which we return later.
15to biased estimates since the omitted bi’s will be captured by the error term, vi.C o u n t r i e s
with higher bliss points will, ceteris paribus, take positions closer to the US, implying that
the error term, vi, will be correlated with actual positions, pi. I.e., cov(pi,b i) > 0 implies
that cov(pi,v i) > 0.
One way to correct for endogeneity caused by unobserved heterogeneity is to rely on a
proxy-variable approach; another way would be to employ a ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator. In this
section we take the former approach, but will have more to say on the latter in Section 3.2.2.
Consequently, we extend the Thacker dataset by constructing a new variable to proxy the
bliss points of the sample countries in the policy space. To do this, we collected the voting
records for all resolutions adopted in the UNGA in a given year. From the voting records on
all resolutions, key votes were subsequently left out. The remaining votes consist on average
of votes on 100 yearly resolutions, which are not identiﬁed as important by the US State
Department. On these resolutions, countries are in our view likely to vote in accordance
with their true political preferences. We use this measure to proxy bliss points. Due to
Article 19 of the UN Charter some countries were not eligible to vote on all resolutions.
Article 19 states that a member country which is in arrears in the payment of its ﬁnancial
contributions to the organization shall have no vote in the UNGA if the amount of arrears
equals or exceeds the amount due from the country for the preceding two years, and if the
reason for the arrears is not beyond the control of the country. We have excluded these
countries since a failure to meet the ﬁnancial obligations may indicate that the country puts
a low value on UN membership, perhaps because its views are not easily expressed in the
UNGA. This would undermine our use of the bliss-point proxy for these countries, since the
country would not be able to reveal its “true” preferences through UN voting.17 We show in
Section 3.2.2 that this exclusion does not change our conclusions. Out of the sample of 83
17Countries excluded are: Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Romania, Sierra Leone, Somalia.
Appendix A.4 lists the countries included in our sample.
16countries in Thacker (1999), this left us with 68 countries.
Following the method in Thacker, we calculated the degree of coincidence between the
sample countries and the US on the non-key votes and denote this variable blissi,t−1 (cor-
responding to bi in the theoretical model). Importantly, kvotei,t−1 is always greater than
blissi,t−1 in the data, except for four country years. This clearly indicates that countries are
moving towards the US as compared to their bliss points, when key votes are at stake and
the US is actively exercising political pressure. This serves as one consistency check of our
proxy for bliss points.
Since, pi (i.e. kvote) is in theory a choice variable and bi (i.e. bliss) is a taste parameter,
we should expect a good proxy for bi to have less variation than kvote. Table 1 describes
the variation in the two variables.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
kvote overall 0.5078 0.1774 0 0.8889
between 0.1296 0.0330 0.7109
within 0.1326 0.1181 0.8489
bliss overall 0.1358 0.0579 0.0469 0.4615
between 0.0393 0.0841 0.2913
within 0.0425 0.0364 0.4010
Table 1. Overall, Between and Within Variation in the Political Variables. Note: number of countries = 68;
number of country years = 558.
A sc a nb e e ns e e nu p o ni n s p e c t i o no fT a b l e1 ,bliss has much less variation compared to
kvote, both within and between. This serves as another consistency check of the bliss-point
proxy.
Finally, it should be noted that the standard error of the bliss-point proxy in the sample
of excluded countries (108 country years) is 0.0852, w h e r e a si ti so n l y0.0579 for the coun-
tries included (558 country years), and this diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant. This could
17indicate that the bliss-point proxy is less reliable among countries that have not met their
ﬁnancial obligations at some point, for reasons alluded to above.
Consequently, a new variable, bidi,t−1,i sd e ﬁned as bidi,t−1 = kvotei,t−1 − blissi,t−1 (cor-
responding to ti = pi − bi in the theoretical model). This variable captures the political
payment of sample country i identiﬁed in our theoretical model. A higher bidi,t−1 means
that a country pays more relative to its own true preferences. We hypothesize that the
probability of receiving an IMF loan is increasing in bidi,t−1.18
3.2.1 Results
Estimation results from the pooled logit model applied by Thacker (1999) are reported in
Table 2. In all estimations, the dependent loan variable is measured in period t,w h e r e a s
explanatory economic variables are lagged by one period, i.e. are measured in period t − 1.
The ﬁrst column, denoted (1), is the original model proposed by Thacker. It is estimated in
the full sample with 83 countries and 746 country years. Model (2) in column 2 is the Thacker
speciﬁcation estimated in the reduced sample of 68 countries and 558 country years.19
Table 2 (columns 1 and 2) documents that moving from the full to the reduced sample
makes little diﬀerence. None of the signiﬁcant variables change sign. In addition, no variable
signiﬁcant at one or ﬁve percent in model (1) ceases to be (marginally) signiﬁcant in model
(2). Thacker’s key political variable mkvotei,t−1 becomes slightly less signiﬁcant in model
(2), but retains its signiﬁcance at the ﬁve percent level. The proximity variable kvotei,t−2,
which was only marginally signiﬁcant in model 1, turns out insigniﬁcant in model (2). In
sum, the key variable is not sensitive to the reduction in sample size and the overall empirical
18We did not have access to the UN voting records for 1984, and hence were not able to compute the bliss
points corresponding to the sample year 1985. Consequently, our data set consists of observations for the
period from 1986 to 1994.
19In every model, we have performed the Hausman test in order to test whether data can be pooled (not
reported). The null hypothesis of homogeneity is never rejected. This should come as no surprise since the
model is dynamically complete.
18model is remarkably stable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Balance of payments -0.00019** -0.0002** -0.00019* -0.00019* -0.00019*
(0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00011)
∆(Balance of payments) -1.22e-06 6.46e-06 9.08e-06 0.00001 6.98e-06
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00008)
Per cap. balance of payments -0.00067 0.00061 0.0006 0.00064 0.0005
(0.00179) (0.00195) (0.00188) (0.00189) (0.00186)
∆(Per cap. balance of payments) -0.00075 -0.00116 -0.0011 -0.00102 -0.00091
(0.0019) (0.00201) (0.00192) (0.00194) (0.00192)
Current account -0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00012 0.00011
(0.0001) (0.00010) (0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00012)
∆(Current account) 0.00009 0.00008 0.00008 0.00008 0.00008
(0.0001) (0.00010) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00012)
Current account to GNP -0.02006 -0.01048 -0.00985 -0.00969 -0.01151
(0.02563) (0.03279) (0.03352) (0.03382) (0.0343)
∆(Current account to GNP) 0.00167 0.00265 0.00279 0.00153 0.00098
(0.02415) (0.02970) (0.03212) (0.03226) (0.03248)
Debt -2.36e-06 1.18e-06 2.40e-06 3.67e-06 2.52e-06
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
∆(Debt) -0.00003 0.00001 0.00002 0.00002 0.00003
(0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Per cap. debt 0.001** 0.00094* 0.00097* 0.00098* 0.00092*
(0.00046) (0.00051) (0.00054) (0.00055) (0.00056)
19table continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆(Per cap. debt) 0.00056 0.00061 0.00066 0.0006 0.00065
(0.00128) (0.00133) (0.00123) (0.00121) (0.00119)
Debt to GNP -0.01058*** -0.01002*** -0.00991*** -0.00958*** -0.00964***
(0.00316) (0.00394) (0.00342) (0.00331) (0.00328)
∆(Debt to GNP) 0.00141 -0.0007 0.00108 0.00112 0.00114
(0.00348) (0.00456) (0.00295) (0.00282) (0.0028)
Interest payments to GNP 0.28359*** 0.31023*** 0.30321*** 0.29338*** 0.30908***
(0.065333) (0.08519) (0.0877) (0.08457) (0.08701)
∆(Interest payments to GNP) 0.50342*** 0.57565*** 0.57301*** 0.57333*** 0.57081***
(0.09957) (0.12634) (0.1472) (0.14337) (0.14335)
Reserves to GNP -0.02635** -0.03554*** -0.0365** -0.03734** -0.03723**
(0.0101) (0.01316) (0.01737) (0.01755) (0.01761)
∆(Reserves to GNP) -0.00045 .010356 0.00909 0.0091 0.00747
(0.02126) (0.03028) (0.03715) (0.03799) (0.03809)
Per capita GNP -0.00036* -0.00022 -0.00023 -0.00024 -0.00021
(0.00021) (0.00023) (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00026)
IMF prog. cancelled since 1975 0.39354* 0.48018* 0.47018* 0.44644* 0.4985*
(0.23081) (0.28238) (0.2742) (0.27059) (0.27439)
US exports -4.76e-06 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00002
(0.00065) (0.00007) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006)
US direct investments -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.00011 -0.00012 -0.00011
(0.0001) (0.00009) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00011)
20table continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
kvote(t-2) 1.24669* 1.08175
(0.71557) (0.88076)








Intercept -2.29364*** -2.52865*** -2.6296*** -2.7444*** -2.4794***
(0.47553) (0.5585) (0.49081) (0.47262) (0.52966)
number of obs. 746 558 558 558 558
Log likelihood -296.3 -207.91 -207.05 -207.38 -206.7
LR chi2 124.9 102.79
Wald chi2 68.09 68.36 68.57
%-correct predict 83.24% 84.59% 84.59% 84.41% 84.41%
Pseudo R2 0.1740 0.1982 0.2015 0.2002 0.2028
Table 2. Pooled logit estimations. Note: *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level,
respectively. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for a country year if the country received a SBA or
an EFF loan during a calendar year. All economic variables are lagged one period. Std. errors are reported
in parentheses; model (3)-(5) are reported with robust std. errors. Time dummies are jointly insigniﬁcant
in all speciﬁcations. Data are taken from IMF, Annual Report, IMF, International Financial Statistics and
the United Nations. See Thacker (1999) for more information.
21In model (3) we proceed to include our key political variable bidi,t−1 = kvotei,t−1 −
blissi,t−1 alongside Thacker’s mkvotei,t−1.20 We are thus trying to statistically choose be-
tween nonnested models (Gourieroux and Monfort, 1994). Model (3) is a "supermodel"
which artiﬁcially nests two competing models, one with bidi,t−1 (our model) and one with
mkvotei,t−1 (Thacker’s model). Interestingly, bidi,t−1 is statistically preferred to mkvotei,t−1
in the sense that the latter turns insigniﬁcant, whereas the former is marginally signiﬁcant.
This allows us to statistically choose bidi,t−1 over mkvotei,t−1 (Davidson and McKinnon,
1993). Hence, we say that bidi,t−1 is statistically preferred to mkvotei,t−1 in the reduced
sample with 558 country years. In model (4), we therefore exclude mkvotei,t−1.N o wbidi,t−1
becomes signiﬁcant at ﬁve percent. Moreover, the pseudo R2 in model (4) is higher than in
model (2).
Model (5) demonstrates that it is not kvotei,t−1 alone that drives our results. When
we include blissi,t−1 and kvotei,t−1, as in model (5), the latter is signiﬁcant at one percent,
whereas the former is signiﬁcant at ﬁve percent. Moreover, blissi,t−1 comes with a negative
sign. Hence, a higher value of blissi,t−1, i.e. a tighter constraint on political payments, lowers
the probability of receiving a loan. Intuitively, this is a sensible result. It would also be the
prediction of the theoretical model in the two-country case when the countries have bliss
points that are suﬃciently far apart.21
Overall, when blissi,t−1 is included in the model, directly as in model (5) or indirectly as
in models (3) and (4), the ﬁti sb e t t e rt h a ni na n ys p e c i ﬁcation where it is excluded. We have
also performed a Wald test on the linear restriction that the coeﬃcient on kvotei,t−1 in model
(5) equals minus the coeﬃcient on blissi,t−1, and we cannot reject this at any conventional
signiﬁcance level.
20We use kvote kvotei,t−1 in the construction of bidi,t−1. Note that Thacker also uses kvotei,t−1 in his
analysis. To see this, use that β1kvotei,t−2+β2mkvotei,t−1 is equivalent to β2kvotei,t−1+(β1−β2)kvotei,t−2.
21We have also estimated a model 6 (not reported) with kvotei,t−1 and bidi,t−1, i.e. a test between
proximity and political concessions. In this model, the former variable is insigniﬁcant whereas the latter is
signiﬁcant at ﬁve percent. Clearly, this is hardly surprising as blissi,t−1 is signiﬁcant in model 5.
22Turning to the marginal eﬀect with respect to a change in the bid variable in model (4), we
obtain (calculated at mean values where the probality of a loan is 0.0793)av a l u eo f0.1567.
The corresponding elasticity at mean values is 0.7348, implying economic signiﬁcance.22
3.2.2 Robustness
In Section 3.1, we argued that countries which were not eligible to participate in part of
the votings in the General Assembly should be excluded. If these countries are included,
the bidi,t−1 variable retains its signiﬁcance at ﬁve percent. When including both bidi,t−1
and mkvotei,t−1 in a supermodel, both turn out insigniﬁcant. So there is apparently no
dominance in the large sample.
This line of reasoning, however, needs some qualiﬁcation. Romania, one of the countries
we have excluded due to Article 19, is the only post-communist transition country in the
dataset. It is generally agreed that very special circumstances and concessions were applied
to the post-communist reformers in their dealings with the IMF (Bird and Rowlands, 2001
and Stone, 2002). Romania should therefore be excluded from the sample.
Excluding Romania and including both bidi,t−1 and mkvotei,t−1 in a supermodel, both
turn out insigniﬁcant again. (Estimating with robust standard errors the former has a p-
value of 0.108 and the latter a p-value of 0.269). In a probit model, however, we obtain that
bidi,t−1 dominates mkvotei,t−1 at ten percent (the former with a p-value of 0.065 and the
latter with a p-value of 0.289).
In sum, dominance can still be found in the larger sample albeit in a somewhat weaker
form. In addition, being statistically preferred in the reduced sample, bidi,t−1 has a higher
information content than mkvotei,t−1. For these reasons, we claim that the exclusion of
countries does not change the conclusion that bidi,t−1 statistically dominates mkvotei,t−1.
As mentioned above, another valid estimation approach would be to rely on a ﬁxed-
22See also Thacker (1999, p. 61).
23eﬀects panel estimator in order to eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. unobserved
bliss points). We have experimented with this (not reported) and results are fully consistent
with our story. Brieﬂy, instead of relying on a dynamically complete logit model as above (see
Wooldridge, 2002 p. 483 for dynamic completeness), we have estimated a parsimonious con-
ditional ﬁxed-eﬀects logit. As emphasized by Wooldridge (2002 p. 409), including suﬃcient
lags in order to induce dynamic completeness is not necessarily desirable when unobserved
heterogeneity is causing the serial correlation in the scores across time. We expect this to
be the case when bliss points are omitted, and a Hausman test conﬁrms the presence of un-
observed heterogeneity. In the conditional ﬁxed-eﬀects logit kvotei,t−1 is always signiﬁcant,
which is in line with bidi,t−1 being the relevant political variable.23
4 Concluding Remarks
IMF lending to developing countries is controversial. Case studies and some econometric
evidence are available, especially on the economic determinants of IMF behavior. Yet much
remains to be learned about how economic and political factors shape IMF decision making.
Also, since formal modelling of the political economy in which this international organization
ﬁnds itself is scant, proper interpretation of results from empirical work is not straightfor-
ward.
In this paper, we put forward a stylized model of US inﬂuence on IMF lending. Assuming
that the US wishes to maximise its overall inﬂuence on debtor countries, we derived an
optimal loan allocation mechanism and articulated a testable hypothesis. It states that
the probability of receiving an IMF loan is increasing in political payments, deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between a given country’s actual policy stand and its true political preference (i.e.
23It should also be mentioned that Bird and Rowlands (2001) report (in their footnote 8) that they have
failed to replicate Thacker’s (1999) results concerning mkvote in a diﬀerent sample that spans a longer period
and includes more loan categories. They did, however, ﬁnd evidence of an eﬀect for proximity, i.e. kvote; a
ﬁnding which is consistent with the story put forward in this paper.
24its bliss point) measured relative to the US.
The model highlights that leaving bliss points unaccounted for (which to our knowledge
is the case in previous work) may hide a potentially important endogeneity problem. We
p r o c e e d e dt op r o p o s ean o v e lb l i s s - p o i n tp r o x ya n dt e s t e do u rm o d e lo nc r o s s - c o u n t r yd a t a .
The data support the claim that the US inﬂuences how the Fund allocates its loans in a
manner which is fully compatible with our model.
In sum, the paper put focus on the need to take account of true political preferences of
member countries in their relationship with the US. Moreover, by capturing such preferences
explicitly through a bliss-point proxy, we believe to have strengthened the view that political
factors, in this case US politics, play a decisive role in IMF decision making.
25A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Take any mechanism
­
(xi (θi,θ −i)),t W
i (θi,θ −i),t L
i (θi,θ−i)
®
i∈N satisfying (2), (3), (4) and
(5). We take the perspective of country i, noting that the argument is symmetric for other










We will argue that h(xi (θi,θ −i)),t i(θi)ii∈N is a feasible direct mechanism. This requires that





Eθ−i [xi (θi,θ −i)]θi − ti(θi) ≥ 0, (12)
ti(θi) ≤ wi, (13)
where wi =1−bi. Since (11) is equivalent to (2) and (12) is equivalent to (3), (11) and (12)
are satisﬁed. Moreover, since tW
i (θi,θ −i) and tL
i (θi,θ −i) satisfy (5), ti(θi) satisﬁes (13).
Weak dominance of the all-pay mechanism follows immediately from the fact that ti(θi)
is a convex combination of tW
i (θi,θ−i) and tL
i (θi,θ −i). That is, payment constraints bind
less frequently in all-pay mechanisms.
26A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Since maxbi ≤ 1 − θ ⇔ minwi ≥ θ, (8) implies that (10) is never violated. The optimal
mechanism is then the solution to the problem (6) to (9), which is solved in Krishna (2002).
Using the fact that valuations are i.i.d., Proposition 5.3 in Krishna gives that an optimal
mechanism is a standard second-price auction. By the revenue equivalence theorem (see
Krishna, Proposition 5.2), the all-pay auction is also an optimal mechanism.
27A.3 Numerical solution
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≤ wi, (for i =1 ,2).
The above mechanism design problem is a linear programming problem, which may have
multiple solutions. In order to explore whether there always exists an optimal auction-type
mechanism satisfying deﬁnition 4, we undertook a systematic numerical analysis. For θ =0 .3
and θ =0 .7 we did numerical optimizations on 28,000 parameter combinations (w1,w 2,v),
28where (w1,w 2,v) ∈ [0,1]3. Speciﬁcally, v ∈ [0.01,1] with a grid of 0.01; w1 ∈ [0.01,w 2] with a
grid of 0.01; and w2 ∈ [0.1,0.7] with a grid of 0.1. First, we solved the linear program. Second,
we imposed deﬁnition 4 as a nonlinear restriction and solved this constrained nonlinear
optimization problem. Third, value functions were compared with an absolute tolerance of
1·10−10. Diﬀerences between value functions were within the tolerance band in 97.38 percent
of the cases.24
24We used linprog and fmincon in Matlab’s optimization toolbox in the numerical study.
29A.4 Sample countries
Algeria Congo Jamaica Nigeria Tanzania
Argentina Costa Rica Jordan Oman Thailand
Bangladesh Cote d’Ivoire Kenya Pakistan Togo
Barbados Ecuador Lesotho Panama Trinidad and Tobago
Benin Egypt Madagascar Papua New Guinea Tunisia
Bolivia Ethiopia Malawi Paraguay Turkey
Botswana Fiji Malaysia Peru Uganda
Brazil Gabon Malta Phillipines Uruguay
Burma Ghana Mauritius Rwanda Venezuela
Burundi Grenada Mexico Senegal Yemen
Cameroon Guyana Marocco Sri Lanka Zaire
Chile Honduras Nepal Sudan Zambia
China India Nicaragua Syria
Colombia Indonesia Niger Swaziland
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